Between the Berlaymont and the Glass Palace How Relative is the EU’s and NATO’s European Defense Capability?

The Belgian town of Berlaymont with the headquarters of the European Commission, the European Union’s supreme executive authority, and the Glass Palace from which the NATO bloc is managed are just five kilometers apart. Yet a review of their approaches to organizing European security suggests that the two institutions reside in different dimensions.

The matter was studied by Daniel Fiott, an Assistant Professor at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), and strategic analyst Davis Ellison.

The authors conclude that, despite an array of acute problems facing Europe (from a belligerent Russia to an ambitious China), the most difficult relationships are often between and within Western-led international institutions such as the EU and NATO.

Their relationship has been a case in point, constrained by political disputes and entrenched suspicion. The two blocs have been unable to find a constructive common language for decades – especially due to the Cyprus-Türkiye-Greece conflict. All the three are EU member States, and the latter two are also NATO members – which fails to quench their mutual hostility.

U.S. politics have been equally disruptive. Trump’s second presidency, with his idea of taking over Greenland belonging to Denmark, has only underscored that the United States’ approach to European security is due for an overhaul. Further, the United Kingdom’s departure removed one of the EU’s most capable military actors and seriously undermined the European Union’s defensive power.

Cooperation between the blocs improved somewhat after the start of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, with much closer dialogue on defense industrial issues and support measures to Kyiv. This, however, was due in part to a stronger transatlantic commitment and close dialogue with EU leadership during the Biden administration, a relationship that has markedly declined under the second Trump administration.

Certain political factors remain barriers to deeper cooperation. Türkiye’s membership in NATO and Cyprus’s membership in the EU are a serious hindrance to practical e­fforts at cooperation. Austria’s veto on Romania and Bulgaria joining the Schengen Area was a point of political difficulty felt at both the EU and NATO. Besides, Austrian and Irish neutrality are often mentioned as an issue in EU-NATO relations, though officials in both Vienna and Dublin note that their constitutional practices of neutrality do not hinder their ability to cooperate and maintain professional armed forces.

The start of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in February 2022 catalyzed deeper cooperation between the EU and NATO. The result has been a more explicit, if still imperfect, division of labor – with NATO as the backbone of collective defense and the EU as an increasingly important actor in defense industrial policy, capability development and partner support.

Notably, the EU’s growing influence in defense and security matters has been a long-standing concern on the other side of the Atlantic. Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s warning against duplication, discrimination and decoupling, sounded back at the verge of the 20th and 21st centuries, showed Washington’s clear expectation that greater European capacity should strengthen NATO rather than dilute US leadership.

America has made clear that it does not want Europe to establish an independent military structure that would challenge NATO decision-making. That means that the cover-hogging process between the organizations will continue. The existing discrepancies are certain to persist in the foreseeable future.