Why and How Europeans Must Prepare for US Retrenchment

A report prepared by the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and entitled Why and How Europeans Must Prepare for US Retrenchment examines two scenarios for the implementation of the U.S. policy of restraint and their possible implications for Europe.

U.S. restraint means a strategy whereby the United States eases tensions with adversaries, steps back from existing alliances, and reduces its overseas military footprint and spending.

Under the first scenario, U.S. policymakers judge that there is no apparent hegemon in Europe or even on its horizon. According to the 2026 National Defense Strategy, the USA begins withdrawing its troops from Europe. Washington hands over the institutions of dominance in Europe to Europeans.

The United States draws back from NATO and encourages European states to use NATO institutions to enable European cooperation without the United States as the hub of the wheel.

Under this scenario, by 2035 there will be roughly 5,000 U.S. troops in Europe – only those required to assist with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and with nuclear weapons. Europe’s defense-industrial base and its aerospace and defense companies grow as they focus on products that European governments want for the defense of Europe.

In the second baseline scenario, the authors assume that U.S. debt levels are a grave and mostly intractable problem (with deficits projected to hit USD 2.5 trillion by 2035). Regardless of who will reside in the White House, the three largest drivers of U.S. deficits and debt – Social Security, Medicare, and interest on the debt – limit the options of the United States.

These constraints are one part of the problem. A second one is the challenge posed to the United States by China. However, Generation X policymakers will remain determined to persist with US global leadership. They kludge together an approach that adheres to all U.S. responsibilities but under-resources every one of them. The United States continues maintaining more than 60,000 troops in Europe.

In Europe, policymakers are at pains to point out that NATO’s door remains open, but no new members are admitted. Russia settles into a frozen conflict with Ukraine. US aid to Ukraine drops close to zero with European states picking up the tab. Although this further stimulates the growth of Europe’s defense-industrial base, a lack of coordination leads to minimal overall capacity gain.

In this bifurcation of scenarios there is a significant possibility that U.S. commitment to European security will weaken by 2035. The causes of it may differ: the United States’ inability to sustain commitment levels, a retrenchment driven by a restraintist administration, or populist-nationalist politics.

So European NATO allies must now start building an alternative security architecture that functions with a much smaller US role and, if need be, can be transitioned to work without the United States. European NATO members should define what limited US support will comprise in the next three, five, and ten years. Then, they must quickly work together to provide the rest.

The European allies’ NATO membership strategy is thus uncertain. All depends on which policy the USA will choose and how it will be applied.